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THE MYTH OF SUPERIORITY

William B. Rubenstein*
Get a group of civil rights lawyers together and there is at
least one thing they would agree upon- they prefer to litigate in
federal, not state, court. 1 Writing in 1977 from his decade-long
experience as a civil liberties litigator, Burt Neuborne codified
2
this sacred tenet in the pages of the Harvard Law Review. In
The Myth of Parity, Neuborne opined that federal courts were
systematically preferable to state courts as a forum for the protection of federal constitutional rights. Neuborne's claim exceeded the simple proposition that federal judges were more politically liberal during this time period. Rather, he set forth an
argument that federal courts were "institutionally preferable to
state appellate courts as forums in which to raise federal constitutional claims. "3
The experience of gay rights litigators in the twenty-two
years since Neuborne's thesis was published challenge his as4
sumptions in several interesting ways. Put simply, gay litigants
seeking to establish and vindicate civil rights have generally
fared better in state courts than they have in federal courts.
That statement poses two challenges to Neuborne's thesis. First,
* Acting Professor, UCLA School of Law. I am grateful for helpful comments I
received on earlier drafts of this article from Evan Caminker, Erwin Chemerinsky, Matt
Coles, Peter Eliasberg, Ruth E. Harlow, Ken Karst, Nan D. Hunter, Dan Lowenstein,
Michael Small, Eugene Volokh and Kenji Yoshino. I am particularly indebted to Steve
Yeazell. While the ideas in this article are mine, the idea that they constituted an article
was his. Attribute blame accordingly.
I. Okay, they probably would also unanimously disdain the stinginess of existing
attorneys' fee provisions, but that's another article.
2. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977). Neuborne
has noted the universality of his thesis. See Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of
a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DePaul L. Rev. 797, 797 (1995) ("My perception (in
the Myth of Parity) was hardly novel. Virtually any experienced constitutional litigator
could-and would-have told the same tale in the 1970's.").
3. Neuborne, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1116 (cited in note 2) (emphasis added).
4. From 1987 to 1995, I was one of these litigators, working as a staff attorney with
the ACLU's national Lesbian and Gay Rights Project.
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it implies that the federal courts were never institutionally better
situated to protect disfavored claimants and that all Neuborne
really experienced in his time as a litigator was a greater representation of liberal judges in the federal courts. This point has
intuitive appeal because during much of the succeeding two decades, the federal courts have largely been dominated by conservative Republican appointees. 5 Perhaps Neuborne's preference
for federal courts and pro-gay litigators' preference for state
courts simply reflect short term trends in the political orientation
of these fora. Yet the gay rights experience might suggest something more meaningful: perhaps it reveals institutional advantages of state courts in protecting individual rights that are
missing from Neuborne's depiction of these competing fora. 6
I. THREE PARITY DEBATES

Since the founding of the Republic, controversy has surrounded the proper role of the federal courts and their relationship to state courts in a federal judicial system.7 A central concern has been how cases involving federal rights, particularly
federal constitutional rights, are allocated between these two
judicial systems. Is a federal forum a necessary adjunct for the
enforcement of a federal right? Or can state courts be trusted to
protect federal rights? The constitution's Madisonian Compromise enables federal issues to be litigated in state courts, while
simultaneously authorizing Congress to establish inferior federal
courts as a forum for the litigation of federal questions and en5. By 1993, Republican presidents had appointed 75% of the sitting federal judges.
Sec Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The FiTIIlllmprint, 76 Judicature 282, 297
(1993). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 593,594
(1991) (stating that in the 1990s the "parity debate appears old and futile. With conservative Reagan and Bush nominees dominating the federal bench, it is unrealistic to assume that federal courts are more likely than state courts to protect constitutional liberties").
6. This point is especially important in that Neuborne himself, though acknowledging the conservative makeup of the federal judiciary, continues to advocate its institu·
tiona I advantages. See Neuborne, 44 DePaul L. Rev. at 799 (cited in note 2) ("I continue
to believe that a relative institutional advantage for the plaintiff exists in federal court").
7. A brief history is set forth in Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining
A Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 233, 239-55 (1988). Regarding the
meaning of this history, compare Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 605,606 (1981) (arguing that state courts have
been prime protectors of constitutional rights "in an unbroken line from the Federalist
Papers down to today's Supreme Court opinions") with Akhil Reed Amar, A NeoFederalist View of Article Ill: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L.
Rev. 205, 230 (1985) (arguing that the Framers distrusted state courts and gave federal
courts the preeminent role in defending federal rights).
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suring that the Supreme Court can have the last word on all determinations of federal law.
The constitutional structure that permits both state and federal courts to rule on federal issues sets the stage for the parity
debate. At the center lies a comparison between the institutional competence of state and federal courts: those who believe
federal courts institutionally superior argue, on this basis, for an
8
expansion of federal jurisdiction, while others resist on the
grounds that state courts are institutionally comparable to federal fora. 9 The parity debate arises in a variety of doctrinal contexts/0 and has been especially palpable for the past halfcentury.11
Dubbing the argument in favor of state court competence
"the myth of parity," Burt Neuborne stepped into the debate in
1977 with a ringing and influential 12 endorsement of the superiority of federal fora. Neuborne's federal-forum-preference the13
sis emanated from his practice experience. But the preference
also responded to growing Supreme Court jurisprudence limiting
federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions. In
fashioning that jurisprudence during the 1970s, the post-Warren
Court justices relied upon the proposition that state courts are as
institutionally capable of protecting federal constitutional rights

8. Neubome's article, cited in note 2, is seen as the preeminent expression of federal superiority.
9. Classic defenses of state courts include Bator, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (cited in
note 7), and Michael E. Solimine and James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 Hastings Const. L.Q.
213 (1983).
I 0. These include: the scope of federal habeas corpus review of state court convictions, see, e.g., Stone 11. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); the ability of federal courts to enjoin
state court proceedings, see Dombrowski 11. P{tster, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), and/or the extent to which they should abstain in deference to ongoing state proceedings. see Younger
11. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), Wisconsin 11. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); the preclusive effect that state court judgments should be granted in later federal proceedings, sec,
e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 11. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Allen 11. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90 (1980); and the availability of relief under federal civil rights laws such as 42
U.S.C. § 1983, see, e.g., Patsy 11. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
II. Chemerinsky attributes this to three late-20th century developments: the application of the federal constitution to the states; the Warren Court's expansion of individual liberties; and state resistance to civil rights. Chemerinsky, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at
242-43 (cited in note 7). See also Chemerinsky, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at 594-98 (cited in note
5) (describing federalism dynamics that gave rise to parity debate in mid-20th century
jurisprudence).
12. Chemerinsky asserts that Ncubome's article "spawned much of the academic
literature on parity" between its publication in 1977 and 1990. Chemerinsky, 71 B. U. L.
Rev. at 598 (cited in note 5).
13. Neubome, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1115 (cited in note 2).
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14

as are their federal counterparts. Neuborne argued that "three
sets of reasons support a preference for a federal trial forum:" 15
First, the level of technical competence which the federal district court is likely to bring to the legal issues involved generally will be superior to that of a given state trial forum. Stated
bluntly, in my experience, federal trial courts tend to be better
equipped to analyze complex, often conflicting lines of
authority and more likely to produce competently written,
persuasive opinions than are state trial courts. Second, there
are several factors, unrelated to technical competencewhich, lacking a better term, I call a court's psychological
set-that render it more likely that an individual with a
constitutional claim will succeed in federal district court than
in a state trial court. Finally, the federal judiciary's insulation
from majoritarian pressures makes federal court structurally
preferable to state trial court as a forum in which to challenge
16
powerful local interests.

Given this understanding of the comparative advantages of
federal courts, Neuborne viewed the Supreme Court's increasing
14. The locus classicus of this premise is a footnote in Justice Powell's decision in
Stone v. Powell:
The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to effectuate the Fourth Amendment
stem from a basic mistrust of the state courts as fair and competent forums for
the adjudication of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state
courts cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through fair
application of the [exclusionary] rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this
Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal rationale for this
view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective institutional settings
within which federal judges and state judges operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional
claims of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there
now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the
trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts, like federal courts,
have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold
federal law. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 341-344 (1816). Moreover, the argument that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional law is especially unpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure
claims, since they are dealt with on a daily basis by trial level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason why the fact that a man is a federal
judge should make him more competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the [consideration of Fourth Amendment claims] than his neighbor in
the state courthouse." Bator, [Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963)] at 509.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976)). Sec also Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
u.s. 592,610-11 (1975).
15. Neubome, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1120 (cited in note 2).
16. Id. at 1120-21. For a point-by-point refutation, sec Solimine & Walker, 10
Hastings Const. L.Q. at 225-32 (cited in note 9); James M. Fischer, Institutional Competency: Some Reflections on Judicial Activism in the Realm of Forum Allocation Between
State and Federal Courts, 34 U. Miami L. Rev. 175, 184-96 (1980).
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reliance on state courts-premised as it was upon the myth of
parity-with suspicion and concern: "to the extent that constitutional cases can be shifted from federal to state trial courts, the
capacity of individuals to mount successful challenges to collec17
tive decisions will be substantially diminished. "
Neuborne's text provides perhaps the strongest argument of
federal court superiority. But it also provides a useful site at
which to disentangle three aspects of the parity debate. For
some judges and scholars the debate revolves around forum allocation-defining the proper role of the federal courts in a federal system and identifying what courts should hear what issues
in what manner. 18 For others the parity debate has operated as a
discourse about forum selection, helping to describe how lawyers
might consider what court system to enter if a choice between a
19
federal and state forum exists. Thus, Neuborne began his consideration of parity in the latter voice-" As a civil liberties lawyer for the past ten years, I have pursued a litigation strategy
premised on two assumptions. . . . "20 - but framed his conclusions in the former voice, "It is the recognition of [federal court
superiority in safeguarding individual rights] and its troubling
ramifications for the viability of constitutional rights-and not
an uncritical assumption of parity-which should be the critical
factor in current federal-state allocation decisions." 21 Still a third
strand of the parity debate emerges from Neuborne's article: the
question of whether the institutional arguments for or against
parity merely provide a seeminglX neutral discourse meant to
mask naked political preferences. 2 Neuborne's distrust of the
neutral discourse of "forum allocation," led him to write that all
such talk might be a "pretext for funneling federal constitutional
decisionmaking into state courts precisely because they are less

17. Neubome, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1131 (cited in note 2).
18. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Daniell. Meltzer, David L. Shapiro, eds.,
Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal System chapter IV (Foundation
Press, 4th ed. 1996); Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of
Judicial Power (Michie Co., 2d ed. 1990).
19. For an overview on forum selection, see generally Note, Forum Shopping Re·
considered, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1677 (1990).
20. Neubome, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1115 (cited in note 2).
21. ld. at 1131. Like Ncubome, most commentators collapse these various strands.
For example, Solimine and Walker, who undertook an empirical study of case outcomes
to address questions of forum allocation, also usc their data to address questions of forum selection. Sec Solimine & Walker, 10 Hastings Const. L.Q. at 240 n.l21 (cited in
note 9).
22. See Michael Wells, Behind The Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process
Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B. U. L. Rev. 609, 611 (1991 ).
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likely to be receptive to vigorous enforcement of federal constitutional doctrine. "23 Here Neuborne implies that beyond forum
allocation and forum selection, the entire parity debate might be
a mere mirage: i.e., the debate may be nothing more than each
side's desire to identify seemingl,y neutral procedural rules that
will achieve its substantive goals. 2
Much subsequent scholarship has sought to find a way out
of the parity debate. Erwin Chemerinsky has labelled as "futile"
attempts to resolve the non-neutrality allegations25 and the fo6
rum allocation debate/ arguing that we should instead focus on
enriching the forum selection opportunities available to constitutionallitigants.27 Chemerinsky contends that the parity debate is
unresolvable both because there are no commonly-accepted criteria by which to measure the performances of the competing
28
fora, and because, even were there, there is no acceptable
methodology for assessing the court systems' adherence to these
29
criteria. His emphasis on maximizing forum selection subtly
23. Neubome, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1105-06 (cited in note 2).
24. Neubome's desire that constitutional doctrine be "vigorously enforced" is itself, of
course. a normative decision that may not be shared by all. But the "parity debate is politics"
scholarship is not criticizing the parity debaters for their orientation toward constitutional enforcement. Rather, this strand of the parity debate is criticizing the debaters for wrapping their
political preferences in what they pretend are neutral-sounding principles, while simultaneously
believing that the neutral-sounding allocation decisions that they espouse will yield particular
case outcomes which they favor.
25. Chemerinsky, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 254 (cited in note 7) ("Arguing about the
true motivations of those who believe in state court superiority will do nothing to resolve
this impasse.").
26. Chemerinsky's characterization of the parity debate as non-resolvable is nicely
captured by Professor Redish's characterization of Chemerinsky's thesis:
So much has been written by both jurists and scholars over the last twenty years
on the issue of state and federal court "parity" that it has been difficult to
imagine at this point anything new being said or some important and original
insight being discerned. What I failed to anticipate, however, was the important
and original insight that there was nothing new to be said on the issue.
Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment
on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 329, 329 (1988)
(footnote omitted).
27. Chemerinsky, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 300-26 (cited in note 7).
28. See also Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of
Judicial Power 2 (1990) ("it would be difficult to devise a system of measurement which
could be used to answer" the question of whether "federal courts are better equipped to
guard federal interests than their state counterparts"); Fischer, 34 U. Miami L. Rev. at
180-84 (cited in note 16).
29. Chemerinsky, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 255-80 (cited in note 7). Martin Redish
disagrees about the futility of resolving the debate; Redish asserts that the institutional
factors, particularly popular election of state judges, render federal courts obviously
more favorable tribunals for the resolution of federal rights. See, e.g., Redish, 36
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 334-35 n.21 (cited in note 26) ("When the issue is the constitutional
protection of minority rights against majoritarian encroachment, [the majoritarian con-
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shifts the debate away from arguments about which forum is
"better" and toward a presumption that constitutional rights are
best protected if widely enforceable.30 By contrast, Martin Redish has argued that the forum allocation issue is non-debatable
because, given Congressional authority to channel federal litigation as it sees fit, the Supreme Court had less discretion in the
matter than the debate requires. 31 Finally, Michael Wells has attempted to unmask the substantive sub-text of the debate, argu32
ing that it is in fact a debate about outcome, not procedure.
Despite desires to resolve the parity debate, it is unlikely to
fade away. Forum allocation questions will endure so long as
our constitutional structure continues to allow federal cases to
be heard in inferior federal courts and state courts. Similarly, forum selection, or forum shopping, will remain a "national legal
pasttime" 33 so long as lawyers can choose between at least two
fora for the resolution of any claim. And, of course, there is no
foreseeable end to the inquiry of whether procedure and substance are distinct entities such that we could discuss, in any rational way, the substantive neutrality of procedure.
Nothing in the following pages "settles" the parity debate.
Little will provide much insight about proper forum allocation.
Indeed, I would agree with Professor Chemerinsky that empirical evidence-particularly anecdotal empirical evidence of the
type that follows-sheds little light on forum allocation decisions.34 Yet both sides of the parity debate re~ularly summon
anecdotal narratives to support their positions. 3 By describing
trol of state judiciaries] is sufficient to render dubious any claim to meaningful judicial
independence in such a context.").
30. Chemerinsky, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at303-10 (cited in note 7).
31. Redish argues that much of the parity debate ought to be subsumed by separation of powers doctrine, in that Congress has carefully dictated the answers to many parity questions (especially those involving abstention), which the Supreme Court has illegitimately ignored. Sec Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the
Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 Yale L. J. 71 (1984). See also Fischer, 34 U. Miami L.
Rev. at 196-211 (cited in note 16). But see Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is
Wrong About Abstention, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 1097 (1985); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985). Redish's responses can be found in Redish, 36
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at345-60 (cited in note 26).
Akhil Reed Amar offers a weaker version of a similar point, arguing that forum allocation is essentially dictated by the Constitution's command that the Supreme Court
have the final word on all matters of federal law, regardless of which court system they
originated in. Sec Amar, 65 B.U. L. Rev. at205 (cited in note 7).
32. Wells, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at609 (cited in note 22).
33. J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law,
13 Wayne L. Rev. 317,333 (1967).
34. Chemerinsky, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 255-79 (cited in note 7).
35. Compare Neuborne, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1115-16 (cited in note 2) (describing
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the experiences of pro-gay litigators, I hope to enrich the forum
selection aspects of the parity debate with a unique, yet perhaps
generalizable, perspective. 36
II. AN UNCONTROLLED EXPERIMENT: THE
EXPERIENCE OF GAY RIGHTS LITIGATORS
Most gay rights litigators grew up in the tradition from
37
which Neuborne wrote. They initially assumed, therefore, that
federal courts would be more receptive to gay claims than would
state courts. A series of First Amendment cases involving the
associational rights of gay student groups in the 1970s supported
this assumption. 38 But a long line of unsuccessful federal cases
challenging discrimination a~ainst gay people cast doubt upon
the federal forum preference. 9 Most centrally, the federal courts
how his practice experience supported federal forum preference) with Bator, 22 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. at 630 (cited in note 7) (stating that: "State supreme court justices as a
group arc as well paid and have as much prestige as federal judges. Those that I have
met seem to me to be as expert on issues of federal constitutional law as arc federal
judges."').
36. See Wells, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at 609, 611 (cited in note 22) ("The real point of contention between the two sides is not parity, but rather the litigating advantage enjoyed by
the party who is allowed to try the case in its chosen forum.").
37. Neubomc was a staff attorney with the New York Civil Liberties Union from
1967-1972, then the Assistant Legal Director of the ACLU from 1972 to 1974. After
spending several years in legal academia-during which he authored the Myth of Parity-Neuborne returned to the ACLU as its Legal Director from 1983 to 1986. Association of American Law Schools, The AALS Directory of Law Teachers 732 (Foundation
Press, 1998-1999).
The ACLU was the principal litigator of gay rights cases until several gay-specific
public interest law firms (National Gay Rights Advocates and the National Center for
Lesbian Rights in San Francisco; Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders in Boston;
and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in New York) grew in size during the
mid-1980s. Many gay rights lawyers in the United States continue to have close connections to the organization and to the basic federal court presumption that Ncubome articulates. For a brief history, sec William B. Rubenstein, In Communities Begin Responsibilities: Obligations at the Gay Bar, 48 Hastings L. J. 1101 (1997).
38. See Gay Lib. v. University of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied
sub nom., Ratchford v. Gay Lib., 434 U.S. 1080 (1978); Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976); Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of New Hampshire v.
Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974); Student Coalition for Gay Rights v. Austin Peay
State Univ., 477 F. Supp. 1267 (M.D. Tenn 1979); Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543
(N.D. Ga. 1972). The federal courts' protection of First Amendment rights in this context was affirmed in later years as well. See Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110
F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1997); Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361 (8th
Cir. 1988); Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1001 (1985). I discuss these cases in further depth, see text accompanying notes 93-97.
39. For example, nearly every federal circuit has rejected constitutional challenges
to the military's anti-gay policies. For citations, see William B. Rubenstein, ed., Cases
and Materials on Sexual Orientation and The Law 663-66 (West Publishing Co., 2d. ed.
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did not offer constitutional protection against state sodomy
laws, 40 an experience which culminated in the Supreme Court's
finding no federal constitutional violation in Georgia's criminalization of private, consensual, adult, sexual practices between two
men. 41
Following the Court's 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,
pro-gay litigators were forced to move their sodomy law challenges across the street to the "inferior" state courts and to rely
on state constitutional protections. 42 But a funny thing happened
after arriving at the disfavored forum: victory. Since Hardwick
was decided in 1986, four state high courts have struck down
their state sodomy laws on the grounds that these laws violate
state constitutional norms. 43 More remarkably, these decisions
1997). The federal courts have rebuffed constitutional challenges to employment decisions in a variety of other contexts as well. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus.
Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) (security clearances); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Federal Bureau of Investigation); Rowland v. Mad
River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (high school counselor), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985); McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971) (library
employee).
40. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975),
affd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (summarily affirming decision of three judge district court that
Virginia sodomy statute was constitutional); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985)
(en bane) (reversing district court decision and upholding constitutionality of Texas sodomy law), cert denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
41. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
42. Neuborne had foreseen this change, attributing it to an institutional characteristic of the federal judiciary-a greater responsiveness to Supreme Court command. Thus,
Ncubornc wrote:
If, as I believe, federal courts are more responsive than state courts to Supreme
Court commands, contraction of federal constitutional rights by the Supreme
Court will be rellected quickly at the district court level. If so, civil liberties
lawyers may be forced to turn increasingly to state courts in hopes of protecting
individual rights under state constitutions.
Neuborne, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1121 n.59 (cited in note 2) (internal citation omitted).
In a host of other important cases, pro-gay litigators had no choice: many family law
issues had to be litigated in state fora, while many federal issues, such as challenges to the
military's policy, had to be litigated in federal fora. Sec Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
397 (1872) (limiting jurisdiction of state courts over federal officials).
43. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d
487 (Ky. 1992); Gryczan v. Stare, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926
S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996), permission to appeal denied. A number of lower state
courts have reached.similar results. Sec Stare v. Smith, 729 So.2d 648 (La. App. 1999)
(finding state sodomy law violates state constitution's right to privacy); City of Dallas v.
England, 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding sodomy law unconstitutional); Stare
v. McGovern, 1998 WL 252236 (R.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 24, 1998) (finding state sodomy law
violates state constitution's equal protection guarantee); Williams v. Glendening, No.
98036031/CL-1059 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct., Oct. 15, 1998) (finding state sodomy law not
applicable to private, consensual, adult, same-sex conduct); Michigan Organization for
Human Rights v. Kelley, No. 88-815820 CZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., July 9, 1990) (holding sodomy law unconstitutional). But sec Missouri v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986)
(en bane) (upholding constitutionality of Missouri sodomy law against federal and state

608

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 16:599

come from states-Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, and Montana
(and intermediate appellate courts in Texas and Louisiana)-not
exactly at the cutting edge of liberal politics. Yet these state decisionmakers have been anything but irresolute. Consider the
derisive tone of the Kentucky Supreme Court, writing six years
after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hardwick:
To be treated equally by the law is a broader constitutional
value than due process of law as discussed in the Bowers case.
We recognize it as such under the Kentucky Constitution,
without regard to whether the United States Supreme Court
continues to do so in federal constitutional jurisprudence.
"Equal Justice Under Law" inscribed above the entrance to
the United States Supreme Court, expresses the unique goal
to which all humanity aspires. In Kentucky it is more than a
•
•
44
mere asp1rat10n.

Family law has provided a second locus for some surprisingly empathetic decisionmaking on gay issues. Hawaii supplies
the prime example. Its Supreme Court rendered a remarkable
1993 decision that the state's ban on same-sex marriages constituted sex discrimination, to be subjected to the highest judicial
scrutiny. 45 New York's high court, in 1989, ruled that a gay male
couple was the legal equivalent of a family, protecting a surviving gay man from eviction from his lover's rent controlled
apartment upon the lover's death from AIDS. 46 California's
courts have enabled same-sex couples to enforce living-together
contracts of the type recognized by the state high court in
Marvin v. Marvin. 47
Beyond these issues involving same-sex couples, state courts
have provided a substantial measure of protection for gay parents. Most state courts now claim that they prohibit sexual orientation from being a factor in child custody and foster care decisions, absent some specific showing that the parent's
orientation is harmful to the child. Though the standards are
malleable, and not always followed, the situation has improved
dramatically in the past 20 years. 48 Many state appellate courts
constitutional challenges).
44. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 501.
45. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
46. Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
47. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). The state appellate courts acknowledged the existence of Marvin-like claims in cases involving same-sex couples in Whonon v. Dillingham, 202 Cai.App.3d 447 (1988) and Jones v. Daly, 122 Cai.App.3d 500 (1981).
48. For an overview, sec Rubenstein, Cases and Materials on Sexual Orientation
and The Law at 808-11 (cited in note 39).
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have permitted a gay or lesbian life-partner to adopt a lover's
children ("second parent adoptions"), thereby creating numerous families throughout the United States in which children are
49
being raised by two legal parents of the same sex.
Finally, state high courts have issued some of the strongest
statements concerning sexual orientation discrimination. California's Supreme Court held sexual orientation discrimination to
be a violation of the state's constitution nearly 25 years ago, simultaneously ruling that "coming out" was protected political
activity under the state labor code. 50 And the highest court of
the District of Columbia held that sexual orientation discrimination warrants the strictest form of judicial scrutiny, analogizing
its protections in D.C. law to those of race discrimination.51
The careful consideration accorded by state courts in manrz
of these gay rights cases has few federal court counterparts. 2
49. See id. at 866-74. See generally, Sonja Larsen, Adoption of Child By Same-Sex
Partners, 27 A.L.R.5th 54 (Lawyers Cooperative Pub., 1995).
50. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
Sec also Collins v. Faith School Dist. No. 46-2, 574 N.W.2d 889 (S.D. 1998) (protecting
school teacher from dismissal based on discussion of homosexuality); Morrison v. State
Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969) (holding that teacher could not be fired for homosexual conduct under immorality clause absent some nexus to his job performance). This
earlier California ruling has a contemporaneous federal court counterpart in Norton v.
Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
51. Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1987). Although the District of Columbia court system is federal in nature, the judges are not Article III judges.
52. Outside the First Amendment arena, there arc only a handful of federal appellate court decisions ruling in favor of plaintiffs in gay rights cases since !977, most of
which have emanated from the Ninth Circuit. Sec Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d
856 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1796 (1998) (selective prosecution of lesbian
articulates equal protection claim); Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997) (persecution on the basis of sexual orientation in Russia grounds for asylum in the United
States); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996) (anti-gay harassment in high
school states equal protection claim); Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d
1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (Congressional statute bars discharge of gay scrvicemcmber on basis
of statements alone); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991) (military must articulate rational basis to support anti-gay policy); Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (military equitably estopped from discharging openly gay
servicemember), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
The instances in which federal appellate courts have reversed affirmative federal district court decisions are, by contrast, almost too numerous to list. Sec, e.g., Able v.
United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996) (reversing district court decision on military
issue); Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261
(6th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court decision striking down Cincinnati ballot initiative); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane) (reversing panel decision in
favor of gay soldier); Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623 (lOth Cir. 1992) (reversing district court
decision holding sexual orientation discrimination to be suspect); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing district court
decision in favor of gay security clearance applicants); Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch.
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For example, several years after the Hawaii marriage case, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the firing
of a lesbian attorney by the Georgia Attorney General because
she and her partner had a private, religious marriage ceremony. 53
After a panel of the Eleventh Circuit had deemed the firing a
violation of the attorney's freedom of association,54 the full Eleventh Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed. The prime example of the
court's disengagement from the constitutional issues at hand can
be seen in its dismissal of the plaintiffs equal protection argument: "the record supports no reasonable inference that the Attorney General revoked Shahar's offer because of her sexual
orientation-as opposed to her conduct in 'marrying' another
woman." 55
It would be an exaggeration to suggest that state courts have
been uniformly supportive of gay rights and federal courts uniformly opposed. The sheer number of state courts,56 and the
higher ,Proportion of gay-specific cases that end up in state
courts, 5 has led to a host of unsympathetic decisions in those
fora. 58 Moreover, the federal courts, including the Supreme
Court in Romer v. Evans, 59 have sometimes accorded protections
Dist.• 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (reversing jury decision in favor of fired bisexual high
school counselor), ccrt. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th
Cir. 1985) (en bane) (reversing district court decision striking down Texas' sodomy law),
cert. denied,478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
53. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en bane), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 693 (1998).
54. Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995), vacated upon grant of reh'g en
bane, 78 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996) (en bane).
55. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1111 n.27.
56. As Neubomc recounts, "There arc about twice as many trial judges in California as in the entire federal system." Ncubomc, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1121 & n.60 (cited in
note 2).
57. Sec text accompanying notes 74-80.
58. See, e.g., Missouri v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) (en bane) (affirming
constitutionality of state sodomy law); Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987)
(affirming constitutionality of ban on gay adoption as rationally related to government
interest in limiting number of homosexuals in society); State ex rei. Grant v. Brown, 313
N.E.2d 847 (Ohio 1974) (affirming refusal of state official to grant corporate charter to
gay organization on grounds that "promotion of homosexuality as valid life style is contrary to the public policy of the state"), cert. denied sub nom,. Duggan v. Brown, 420 U.S.
916 (1975).
59. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Though Romer is surely an example of a favorable federal
court ruling on gay rights, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion is hardly "eloquent and
technically precise." Ncubomc, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1123 (cited in note 2). Various
scholars' attempts to divine a general principle underlying the decision are evidence of
the ruling's abstruseness. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Essay, Attainder and Amendment
2: Romer's Rightness, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 203 (1996) (arguing that the Bill of Attainder
Oause "clarifies and supports" the majority's theory in Romer); Daniel Farber and
Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 Const. Comm. 257 (1996) (arguing that Romer
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for pro-gay positions, most notably in the First Amendment
cases discussed above. 60 I also doubt that state courts would
handle some gay rights cases, such as the military challenges, any
more sympathetically than federal courts have.
Nonetheless, the record just rehearsed supports at least two
statements. The federal courts have not proved uniformly more
hospitable to civil rights claims. And state courts have not abdicated their responsibilities to civil rights claimants. But more
important than the scorecard, the gay rights experience suggests
some insights into the institutional competence of state courts
not evident in Neuborne's account.

evolves from a "firmly rooted" principle in existing constitutional law that "forbids the
government from designating any societal group as untouchable''); Jane S. Schacter,
Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 361 (1997) (providing a
normative foundation for Romer grounded in democratic theory); Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 67 (placing the Romer decision in the context of debates about judicial activism
and arguing that Romer is both radical and conservative-like the Warren Court itself).
The same is true of the Court's decision in another case of importance to gay rights
advocates, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Though Oncale-the victim of same-sex sexual harassment-was not himself gay, his case had the
support of gay rights groups who argued that the same-sex nature of the sexual harassment Oncale faced should not remove it from the protections of Title VII. Sec, e.g.,
Brief of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, et al., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 1997 WL 471805 (filed Aug. 11, 1997). Though the Court's outcome
permits the prosecution of same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title VII, Justice
Scalia's opinion sidesteps as many issues as it answers.
My point here is not that state courts are more elegant than federal courts. I am
simply attempting to cast doubt upon Ncuborne's contention that federal courts compose
more technically proficient opinions than their state counterparts. Neither Romer nor
Oncale were graceful opinions.
60. Sec text accompanying note 38. Sec also Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 654 F.2d 304
(5th Cir. 1981) (en bane) (per curiam) (finding unconstitutional the firing of a public employee for proposed testimony in favor of civil rights for homosexuals, as testimony held
to be protected speech not interfering with operation of office); Acanfora v. Board of
Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974) (finding that school teacher's media appearances concerning homosexuality were protected speech that did not disrupt his workplace, but upholding his firing on other grounds); Glover v. Williamsburg Local School Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 20 F. Supp.2d 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (holding that non-renewal of teaching contract because of sexual orientation violates federal equal protection clause); Weaver v.
Nebo School Dist., 29 F. Supp.2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that firing of lesbian
teacher/volleyball coach violated first amendment and equal protection clause); Fricke v.
Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980) (upholding First Amendment right of male high
student school to take male date to prom); Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 434 F.
Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977) (finding teacher's public statements about homosexuality did
not disrupt workplace and thus employment safeguarded by First Amendment).
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III. SOME NOTES ON THE INSTITUTIONAL
COMPETENCE OF STATE COURTS
Neuborne identified three characteristics of the federal
bench that, he contended, yielded systematically better results
for civil liberties claimants: competence, mindset, and insulation
from majoritarian pressures. In the context of gay rights claims,
each of these factors favors state courts (or, at a minimum, does
not favor federal courts). The state courts' record on gay rights
issues thus emerges as a systemic, rather than political, result.
A. TECHNICAL COMPETENCE
Federal courts rarely involve themselves in domestic relations and probate matters. These matters are creatures of state
law and are typically litigated in specialized state courts. The
predilection for the state forum in these cases is so strong that
the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted Congress' grant of subject matter jurisdiction in diversity cases not to encompass domestic reactions. 61
This jurisdictional limitation insulates federal courts from a
primary site at which gay peogle (as gay people) interact with
the legal system: family courts. Lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals appear in divorces, custody, and visitation decisions, as well
as in the growing number of cases involving the formation and
dissolution of gay families. 63 State judges, particularly family
court judges, therefore deal with gay issues on a regular basis in
a real world context. A family court judge might be asked to decide whether it is in the best interests of a child to be placed in
the custody of a gay or non-gay parent. She has probably heard
gay and bisexual people testify about their lives. She may have
had to confront and analyze testimony about the nature of homosexuality or about the relationship between sexual orientation and parenting ability. She has had to weigh her biases concerning homosexuality in the trenches. Even if she has not had a
gay-specific case, the family court judge regularly makes decisions about what is in "the best interests of the child." Because
of the fact-bound nature of such decisionmaking, a state family
court judge would appreciate the difficulty of making sweeping
pronouncements about parenting abilities.
61. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
62. For a fuller discussion, see text accompanying notes 74-80.
63. See generally, Rubenstein, Cases and Materials on Sexual Orientation and The
Law at 801-918 (cited in note 39).
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Given this institutional familiarity, I would generally prefer
to argue a case concerning gay parents in a state court than in a
federal court. In considering a forum for a constitutional chal64
lenge to a statutory ban on gay foster care or adoption, I would
argue for a state trial court over a federal trial court. Such discriminatory state laws act to cabin state trial judge discretion.
State trial judges appreciate how much discretion they need in
employing the "best interests" standard and they will hardly be
shocked that gay people are parents-even parents who often
deserve custody or visitation. Make a federal case out of this local family law issue, however, and you risk gulling a panel of
federal judges, who, from their "ivory tower" lack the nuanced
instincts necessary to comprehend the values at issue in the
66
case.
I helped to represent an HIV-infected woman in South
Carolina in the late 1980s.67 She had been incarcerated in the
state mental health facility without any due process whatsoever-she was literally picked up off the street by the state
health agency and sent to the mental health facility because the
health agency feared she was spreading HIV through the sharing
of needles and/or prostitution. When called into the case, the
ACLU adopted a Neubornian attitude-we filed a habeas corpus petition on behalf of the woman in federal court. In writing
the petition, we carefully checked state law and learned that
there was no statutory habeas corpus proceeding in the state
courts in such a situation, thus arguably making the federal fo64. The state of Florida is currently the only state that retains an explicit ban on gay
adoption. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.042(3) (1997). The New Hampshire legislature re·
cently repealed its ban. See 1999 New Hamphsire Laws Ch. 18 (H.B. 90) (effective July
2, 1999), available in Westlaw, 1999 NH H.B. 90 (SN). Many states have regulations or
informal policies making it more difficult for lesbians and gay men to adopt or become
foster parents. See Rubenstein, Cases and Materials on Sexual Orientation and The Law
at 863, n.5 (cited in note 39).
65. Neubome, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1125 (cited in note 2).
66. The New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision on this precise issue, Opinion of
the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987), as well as some decisions from Florida appellate
tribunals, Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So.2d 1210 (Fla.
App. 1993) (en bane), affd in part and rev'd in part, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995), weaken
my argument slightly. In these cases, the state appellate courts did not demonstrate the
sensitivity I suggest state court judges would. However, this may indicate an institutional
distinction between appellate and trial courts more than it confirms a similarity between
federal and state courts. Moreover, the primary point of my argument is that in forum
shopping, litigants ought not automatically favor a federal tribunal. That particular state
courts do not perform ideally in particular cases does not undermine the thrust of this
thesis.
67. A fuller rendition of the case appears in William B. Rubenstein, Law and
Empowerment: The Idea of Order in the Time of AIDS, 98 Yale L.J. 975,984-86 (1989).
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rum our only choice. Upon arriving at the federal court (in Columbia's Strom Thurmond Courthouse) on the day of the hearing, we were confronted by a Reagan-appointed federal district
court judge who wanted nothing to do with the case. Notwithstanding the obvious federal constitutional violation by state officials, the federal judge refused to act, directing us to the state
courts to exhaust non-existent state court remedies. So far, this
story may show nothing more than a Neubornian bias by the
civil liberties lawyers and a conservative bias by the federal
court.
But what happened next is telling: upon crossing the street
to state court, we were assigned to a state judge with an entirely
different reaction. He was appalled that the state would have
acted in such a flagrantly unconstitutional manner. Had we met
a politically liberal judge? Perhaps, but more pertinently, we
had met a judge who handled competency proceedings on a
regular basis-he knew the statutory requirements for due process in these situations and appreciated the gravity of the state's
error. Arguably a more liberal federal jurist would have been
equally responsive, but the enormity of the disparity between
what was legally required and what was actually done in the particular case was far more palpable to the jurist seasoned in these
cases.
Neuborne appreciated the precise distinction I rely upon
here, but drew a different conclusion from it: he described the
day-to-day experiences of state judges as "cynicism-breeding,"
fearing that they "foster a jaded attitude toward constitutional
rights." 68 Federal judges, Neuborne opined, because of their distance "from the pressures and emotions generated by the application of constitutional doctrine" are more likely to produce "a
generous reading and vigorous enforcement of constitutional
rights. "69 The story I tell here challenges this assumption. It certainly does not prove that all state judges are better situated to
approach civil rights cases. But it does suggest that day-to-day
experiences can breed institutional advantages, as well as disadvantages.70

68.

Neubome, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1125 (cited in note 2).
ld. at 1125.
70. See also, Bator, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 634 (cited in note 7) ("The elitism of
the federal bench, its distance from much of the daily grind of the administration of justice, its specialization -all of these are advantages, but they arc disadvantages too.").
69.
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B. PSYCHOLOGICAL SET

There are several characteristics of state judges-that they
may more regularly interact professionally with gay people, that
they are at the same level in our federal structure as their legislative counterparts, that their decisions are geographically
bounded, and that there are a lot of them- which together create significant opportunities for civil rights lawyers. (Utilizing
Neuborne's terminology, I will refer to these attributes of state
judges as their "psychological" set, though neither of us utilize
that term in a clinical fashion.)
First, as to familiarity: state courts' interactions with lesbians and gay men not only give them substantive expertise that
might make them institutionally better situated to rule favorably
for gay people. Such interactions also breed familiarity with lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. One would hope that familiarity
would in turn produce tolerance, if not acceptance, and hence
lead to more favorable outcomes. This point is slightly different
from the first point: there I suggested that a state judge's general
familiarity with family law might make her more understanding
of the problems of gay discrimination in that setting. Her background might provide this substantive advantage because she has
actually heard gay cases. But whether she has or not, she appreciates the general subject matter area in a way a federal judge
may not. My point in this sub-section is more gay-specific: here I
mean to suggest that state judges are more likely to have encountered and dealt professionally with gay people themselves.
And I assume that such personal interactions make bias less
likely.
A few examples will help illuminate the point. When, in the
late 1980s, the ACLU embarked on an effort to challenge the
constitutionality of Florida's ban on homosexual adoption, we
considered the various fora in which such a case might be
lodged. One axis of decisionmaking pitted the state courts (trial
and appellate) against the Florida federal district courts, Eleventh Circuit, and Supreme Court. Within each system, there
were also geographic distinctions to consider. After selecting the
state court system, we lodged an initial action in the state judicial
district encom~assing Key West, Florida. Our hypothesis,
proven correct, 1 was that a state judge in Key West would have
71. See Seebol v. Faire, No. 90-923-CA-18 (16th Judicial Circuit, Monroe County,
Florida, Mar. 15, 1991) (holding state law unconstitutional). Because the state did not
appeal this decision, its affirmative outcome was isolated to Monroe County. The deci-
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a familiarity with gay people that would work to our client's favor in the case. When New York's high court ruled in 1989 that
a gay couple was the legal equivalent of a family, 72 the court was
split into three camps-a plurality of three, a concurrence, and
two dissenters. All three of the judges in the plurality (Titone,
Kaye, Alexander) were from New York City, as was the concurring judge (Bellacosa), while both dissenters (Simons, Hancock)
were from upstate.73 Each of these examples involves geographical comparisons among state court judges-not between state
and federal court judges-but the examples nonetheless demonstrate my general point: that a judge's familiarity with gay people
might affect her sympathies. It follows that if state judges are institutionally situated so as to interact with gay people more often
~han federal judges, then they might systemically have less bias
m gay cases.
I would guess that the three primary ways gay people interact with the legal system in which their sexual orientation might
be put at issue is in family law cases;74 criminal cases;75 and as jurors.76 Because of this fact, state judges in their judicial capacity
are far more likely to have dealt, in a professional environment
sion is reprinted in William B. Rubenstein, ed., Lesbians, Gay Men, and The Law 517-22
(New Press, 1993).
72. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
73. Chief Judge Wachtler had recused himself.
74. Family law cases constitute, by far, the largest category of reported case law
concerning gay people, a fact that is striking in that family law cases are infrequently reported. Yet as a person's sexual orientation is not generally visually identifiable, it is understandable that it would emerge as an issue most often in the area of law most intrusive
into the personal realm.
75. Men with same-sex sexual desires have long been a subject of the criminal law.
See generally, Nan D. Hunter, Sherry! E. Michaelson, and Thomas B. Stoddard, The
Rights of Lesbians and Gay Men: The Basic ACLU Guide to a Gay Person's Rights 11831 (1992). Police throughout the United States have traditionally arrested men for engaging in sexual activities in quasi-public places. Whether or not these men claim a gay
sexual identity (many are married), their activities bring their sexuality to the regular
attention of local state prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.
More recently, criminal justice agencies have been charged with collecting statistics
on sexual orientation-related hate crimes. See Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No.
101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990). These agencies have had to develop policies for the reporting and handling of anti-gay bias.
76. A person's sexual orientation can emerge in the jury box either if it has some
relevance to the case at hand or if the basic voir dire questions provoke information relating to it. See generally, Paul R. Lynd, Juror Sexual Orientation: The Fair Cross-Section
Requirement, Privacy, Challenges for Cause, and Peremptories, 46 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 231
(1998). When I served on a civil jury in San Francisco, I was asked to stand in open court
and describe where I lived, with whom, and whether I was married. In responding to
these questions, my sexual orientation was revealed (as was that of a number of other gay
men and lesbians in the pool, as well as that of many married and unmarried heterosexuals).
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and in a professional manner, with lesbians and gay men.n
Moreover, many of these state judges are former state prosecutors. They are more likely to have encountered lesbians and gay
men in routine local criminal cases or in hate crimes statistic
collection than would their federal counterparts, many of whom
spent their careers prosecuting federal crimes or representing
corporate clients. Often, state judges are local political figures.
As such, they probably have responded to a myriad of gay issues
and interacted with gay (and anti-gay) political groups. Finally,
many state judicial ethics codes bar bias on the basis of sexual
78
orientation while the federal code of judicial ethics does not.
And state court systems have taken a tentative lead over their
federal counterparts in studying bias on the basis of sexual orien79
tation in the profession and at the bar. These developments
add to the mindset of the state jurist an aspirational edict that
gay people be treated fairly in the courtroom.
All of these institutional differences suggest that many state
court judges will have a familiarity with lesbians and gay men
and with gay issues not necessarily shared by their federal counterparts.80 That familiarity might tend to make gay people less
exceptional and gay rights cases less shocking to state courts
than to federal courts.
A second aspect of the state judge's psychological set that
renders her institutionally preferable to a federal court concerns
77. There are also more openly-gay state judges than the single openly gay federal
judge. See William B. Rubenstein, Queer Studies II: Some Reflections on the Study of
Sexual Orientation Bias In the Legal Profession, 8 U.C.L.A. Women's L.J. 379, 401-2
(1998). Cf. Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and The
Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1682, 1698 (1991) (arguing that the "less visible relationship between women and the federal courts is supported by pervasive ideological,
legal, and sociological assumptions and actions").
78. See Jennifer G. Brown, Ethics and Equal Protection: Anti-Bias Rules as an Imperfect Substitute for Heightened Scrutiny (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
79. Sec generally Rubenstein, 8 U.C.L.A. Women's L.J. (cited in note 77). Judith
Resnik makes a similar point about the relationship between the federal and state courts
regarding gender bias:
Those who governed the state courts developed a sense of urgency about the
relationship of courts to women. After inquiry, many state task forces concluded that women were "denied credibility" in courts and faced "a judiciary
undcrinformed about matters integral to many women's welfare." Yet that urgency to study bias against women was not shared by those who governed the
federal courts.
Resnik, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1690 (cited in note 77) (footnotes omitted).
80. This conclusion cries out for a further exploration of the ways in which lesbians,
gay men, and bisexuals might become more visible in the federal courts. Compare Resmk, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1700-29 (cited in note 77) (discussing "women's places in 'the
federal courts"').
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her relationship to her state legislature. No matter what forum
they select, plaintiffs in constitutional cases face an enormous
countermajoritarian hurdle when asking a court to set aside a
legislative enactment. But plaintiffs who pursue such a challenge
to a piece of state legislation in federal court double their burden-they complicate the separation of powers concern with a
federalism concern. Now they are not only asking a judge toreverse a legislative enactment, they are asking a federal judge to
reverse a state legislative enactment. The federal courts' sensitivity to this concern, only heightened during the Rehnquist era,
suggests that state judges have one less institutional barrier when
reviewing state legislative enactments than do their federal counterparts.
The fact that a state court is reviewing state legislation or
executive action suggests yet another institutional advantagethe consequences of its decision are geographically bounded.
Plaintiffs' attorneys might prefer a victory in federal court on
federal constitutional grounds as it would have wider effects.
The opposite outcome in Bowers v. Hardwick would, for example, have eliminated sodomy laws throughout the United States
in one decisive swoop. But for that very reason, federal judges
may be more hesitant in their rulings.
A final advantage of state courts is that the sheer quantity
of state judges suggests, in a country as diverse as ours, that the
opportunities for exceptional positions are greater. Only one
state supreme court has ever accepted the notion of same-sex
marriages, the decision was rendered by only three judges, and it
cut against a large body of contrary case law. Nonetheless, the
Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr constituted a momen81
tous turning point for the gay rights movement.
Neuborne
notes that the federal bench is drawn from a "homogenuous" socioeducational class, one he believes makes federal judges more
82
apt to be protective of constitutional values. Yet that very homogeneity restricts opportunities for exceptional, even deviant,
pronouncements. For a small and relatively new social movement, securing outlying but affirmative rulings may be more
productive than attempting to secure an unattainable national
consensus. A single court ruling can make the previously unthinkable suddenly real.

81.
82.

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
Neubornc, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1126 (cited in note 2).
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C. MAJORIT ARIAN PRESSURES
Neuborne argued that majoritarian pressures worked
against civil rights and that federal courts, best insulated from
83
such pressures, would best protect civil liberties. This is too
simple a picture. Majoritarian pressures on state courts can often make these courts more- not less- institutionally responsive
to minority claims.
True, the need to be reelected sometimes requires judges to
84
trim their legal sails to the prevailing winds. But political processes are typically far more complicated. For those running for
office, voters, not "public opinion," is what counts. In areas
where a minority group has some political presence, a judge
might need to solicit the support (or at least ensure against the
opposition) of that minority, even though it is only a minority. If
the concern about majoritarian pressure is that judges will decide cases to get votes, in some places state judges might decide
. h an eye towar ds gay voters. 85
cases wit
83. See also Redish, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 333-38 (cited in note 26) ("Can one realistically suggest that we can trust the independent judgment of [elected state judges] in
cases challenging the constitutionality of state action?").
84. In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,386-87 (1821), Chief Justice Marshall expanded on this concept, noting that "In many States the judges arc dependent for
office and for salary on the will of the legislature. . . . When we observe the importance
which [the Constitution] attaches to the independence of judges, we arc the less inclined
to suppose that it can have intended to leave these constitutional questions to tribunals
where this independence may not exist." But as defenders of state courts point out, the
premise is refuted by the many countcr-majoritarian decisions state courts routinely
make. See generally, Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 Yale
L.J. 227,248-49 (1972).
85. I am indebted to my colleague Dan Lowenstein for pointing out that this proposition would be especially likely in situations in which an issue would be visible enough to
be noticed by gay people (or at least politically-active gay people), but not so highly visible as to attract the attention and interest of the public generally. Some gay-specific
family law issues would seem to fit into such a category. Openly gay people might well
be aware of a local judge's record in custody or visitation cases or in granting second parent adoptions to gay parents. At the same time, the general public would probably not
even be aware of the existence of such issues.
This is not to suggest, as does Justice Scalia without any empirical support, that:
because those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities, have high disposable income, and of
course, care about homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public
at large, they possess political power much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645-46 ( 1996) (Scalia, J.. dissenting) (citations omitted). My
contention is far narrower: that in certain carefully defined situations. a discrete and insular minority group might have more political power on a local level than would conventionally be expected and thus might occasionally benefit rather than suffer from an elected judiciary. See
generally Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985) (arguing
that "anonymous and diffuse victims of poverty and sexual discrimination" may be more worthy
of judicial protection from majority rule than discrete and insular minorities).
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Second, this political point has a significant corollary-state
judges hobnob with local political groups, particularly local bar
groups, while their federal counterparts have no need to. The
annual dinners of local gay bar associations can become bogged
down by the recognition of each state court judge in attendance.
The judges are there, in part, to keep their electoral fences in order. They may also be there because they desire the backing of
the constituent bar association as they ascend the ranks of the
state judiciary. Sometimes they are there simply because they
are politicians and this is what politicians do. But no matter why
they are there, once they are there, they become more informed
about the gay community, including its issues, its leaders, and its
lawyers. Whether this translates into favorable judicial rulings
or not, it ought to contribute to familiarity with gay geople that
would make extreme anti-gay legal rulings less likely.
Third, federal judges' insulation from political developments can be harmful if political trends are developing in ways
that are helpful to one's cause. Life tenure implies less turnover
and may translate into an older federal judiciary. With an
emerging social group like lesbians and gay men, it is likely that
younger judges will harbor fewer unreflective biases. In one of
the gay-related military challenges, a federal district court judge
87
referred to the plaintiff as a "homo. " It is not surprising to
learn that the judge was in his 80s at the time. That judge would
be unlikely to be sitting on a state court bench.
Lesbians and gay men do not constitute a significant voting
bloc. They might therefore be at great disadvantage in a system
of elected judges. But gay issues are rarely the direct subject of
judicial elections. The highest profile example of such an election concerned the removal of a Texas state court judge after he
88
made anti-gay comments in sentencing the killers of a gay man.
State judicial candidates may well reflect the general attitudes of
their constituents, but it is difficult to identify directly negative
consequences to gay people flowing from the fact that state
judges are often elected. 8 Against this presumption must be
86. Sec Part III(B).
87. For reference to the incident, see Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 60 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
88. See Anti-Gay Dallas Judge Wins Another Term, Seattle Times A2 (Mar. 15,
1990), available at 1990 WL 3203101.
89. Indeed, it is rare that any political issue affects the re-election of state court
judges, who are retained by voters about 98-99% of the time, hence "judges rarely decide
cases with an eye to electoral review." Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Courts, State Courts,
and The Constitution: A Rejoinder to Professor Redish, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 369, 372
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weighed the positive consequences of judicial elections outlined
above 90 and the fact that federal judicial appointments have
brought us anything but a civil rights-friendly judiciary.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Pro-gay litigants have met with surprising success in state
courts in the past decades. The sodomy law cases, coupled with
the Hawaii marriage decision and some related family law cases,
suggest that state courts can be hospitable fora for civil rights
cases. I have suggested that the gay rights experience highlights
some institutional strengths of state fora-substantive expertise,
human familiarity and a psychological set receptive to constitutional challenges, and a sensitivity to political change. I draw no
conclusions from these observations whatsoever about how
Congress or the Supreme Court ought to allocate cases between
state and federal courts. The conclusion I do draw is that civil
rights attorneys generally should do what gay rights attorneys
specifically have done: abandon an automatic presumption in favor of federal courts and weigh the available opportunities in
state courts in light of this history.
Although this account provides a more complicated picture
of forum selection decisions than N euborne drew in 1977, several qualifications must be noted. First, I have somewhat elided
the distinction between federal constitutional claims and state
constitutional claims. In its purest form, the parity debate concerns whether state courts can be trusted to enforce federal constitutional rights. Most of the pro-gay state court rulings that I
discuss have relied on state constitutional (and nonconstitutional) norms. In this sense, the story I tell here might
simply serve as proof of the importance of state constitutions, an
(1988); sec also id. at 371 n.7 (citing studies demonstrating that judges are generally retained about 98-99% of the time). Chemcrinsky states generally:
Electoral accountability only undermines state judicial independence if state
court judges fear that voters will use their decisions as the basis for casting their
votes. But how many cases are of sufficient visibility to influence votcrs'l Realistically, it is unlikely that many cases arc decided differently because of fear
of voter rejection at the next election. In fact, it appears that few voters arc
able to distinguish between judges in retention elections.
Chcmerinsky, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at 599 (cited in note 5) (footnote omitted). For a sympathetic review of the social science literature, sec Solimine & Walker, 10 Hastings Const.
L.Q. at 230-32 (cited in note 9).
90. It might seem contradictory that elected judges associate politically with gay
groups even though their retention hinges little on these groups' acceptance. Yet many
of these judges seek to move up through the ranks of the state judiciary, an ambition
which can be influenced by organized bar groups.
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argument made by Justice Brennan in the same volume of the
Harvard Law Review as Neuborne's Myth of Parity. 91 But there
is an inherent tension between the Brennan and Neuborne theses-it is unlikely that state courts would simultaneously be
sympathetic to state constitutional ar~uments and unsympathetic
to federal constitutional arguments. Hence even if the relatively positive experience of pro-gay litigators in state courts
does not directly contradict Neuborne's thesis, it nonetheless
significantly weakens it.
I have made a second noticeable adjustment to Neuborne's
thesis to make my point: Neuborne wrote primarily of federal
civil liberties claims, while I have discussed issues that primarily
concern civil rights and family law. On civil liberties issues involving gay people-e.g., First Amendment claims-the federal
courts have been remarkably solid, as Neuborne suggested they
93
would be. But from this I draw an important conclusion: if federal courts enjoy an institutional advantage with regard to civil
liberties issues, perhaps state courts have some institutional advantages in safeguarding group rights when equality claims are
involved. 94 Why would this be the case? 95 Liberty claims, for ex91. Sec William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). See also Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and
State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1141 (1985);
Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 StJohn's L. Rev. 399
( 1987): Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States· Bill of Rights, 9 U. Bait. L.
Rev. 379 (1980). The fact that a number of landmark federal constitutional decisions
were long pre-dated by state constitutional rulings provides further proof of the importance of state constitutions. Thus, for example, the California Supreme Court struck
down the state's miscegenation laws in 1948, Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948),
nearly 20 years prior to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
92. But sec Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (rejecting federal constitutional privacy challenge to prohibition on same-sex marriage while accepting state constitutional equal protection challenge).
93. Sec text accompanying notes 38 & 60.
94. It is interesting to note that Solimine and Walker's empirical survey found a
similar disparity. In civil cases, federal courts upheld First Amendment claims 53.8% of
the time, while state courts upheld such claims only 40.3% of the time. By contrast, in
civil cases, federal courts upheld Fourteenth Amendment claims 32.8% of the time, while
state courts upheld such claims 28.7% of the time. sec Solimine & Walker, 10 Hastings
Const. L.Q. at 243-44 (cited in note 9). Federal courts had a slight advantage in both instances, but a statistically significant advantage only in the First Amendment arena.
Though I make this observation about their data, I would not defend Solimine and
Walker's methodology in light of later critiques. Sec, e.g., Chemerinsky, 36 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. at 261-69 (cited in note 7). But sec Michael E. Solimine and James L. Walker, State
Court Protection of Federal Constitutional Rights, 12 Harv. J.L. Pub. Pol'y 127 (1989) (responding to critics).
95. Cf. Bator, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 631-32 (cited in note 7) (asking whether
federal judges arc superior to state judges on questions of civil liberties only, and not,
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ample free speech claims, are often brought on behalf of iconoclastic individualists undertaking provocative acts. Neuborne
makes a strong argument that the insulation and scholarly tradition of federal judges may make them more intellectually responsive to such claims. Equality claims, however, are brought
on behalf of social groups. In the case of gay people, the social
group is widely dispersed throughout the population, is organized electorally in some geographical areas, and reappears regularly in certain portions of the legal system. The repeat nature of
gay issues in family courts may create institutional advantages in
state courts.96 Moreover, the imbeddedness of the gay rights
struggle in on-going political processes creates opportunities in,
as well as disadvantages from, elected state fora. State judges
not only handle gay issues and interact with gay people more often than federal judges, but, perhaps most importantly, these interactions are often at a deeper and more meaningful level of
engagement than those between gay people and federal judges.
A federal judge ruling on a first amendment claim is engaged in
an abstract intellectual enterprise. A family court judge ascertaining the best interests of a child has her hands in the guts of
day-to-day gay family life. The opportunities for pro-gay socie97
tal change may be much greater in such settings. These factors
distinguish the equality plight of lesbians and gay men from the
liberty concerns of random individualists.
The argument suggests that state courts have the potential
to be more hospitable to group claims if the group at issue enjoys
certain critical organizational characteristics: if legal issues central to the group are regularly litigated in state courts and if
group members are electorally organized and are able to utilize
the ballot box. If I am correct, these criteria would help explain
the disparate experiences of civil rights litigators and women's
perhaps on other constitutional questions).
96. See generally Marc Galanter, Why The "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y. Rev. 95 (1974).
97. Following the intellectual lead of Michael J. Sandel, see Moral Argument and Liberal
Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality. 77 Cal. L. Rev. 521 (1989), a number of scholars have
recently argued that pro-gay advocates should engage in, rather than bracket, moral forms of
argument in legal discourse. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation. Morality. and the
Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 237 ( 1996); Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations For a
Discourse On Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism. 85 Geo. L.J. 1871
(1997). See also Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights. Thick and Thin. 49 Stan. L. Rev. 45 (1996);
Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History
of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights. 79 Va. L. Rev. 1643 (1993). The types of issues litigated in state courts may afford such opportunities more easily than do the abstract legal principles with which federal judges are, conventionally speaking. most comfortable.
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rights supporters in state courts. Blacks in the South in the 1950s
were systematically denied the opportunity to vote, not permitted to organize politically, and were disproportionately poor and
unable to influence judicial elections. Women appear regularly
in family law cases in state courts, vote in high numbers, and are
widely dispersed throughout the socio-economic strata. Judith
Resnik has suggested that these types of factors help explain why
state courts have responded more quickly to issues of gender
98
bias than have the federal courts. These criteria can also help
explain why, and when, state courts have an institutional advantage with regard to group-based equality claims, similar in nature
to federal court superiority regarding liberty claims. 99
While my experience leads me to qualify Neuborne's assessment of institutional advantages, both of our conclusions
need to be further qualified: We must ask when and whether
such institutional factors outweigh straightforward political considerations. Whatever their alleged institutional advantages, the
federal courts have proved unsympathetic to a wide variety of
civil liberties and civil rights concerns because of the political
ideology of those who have appointed and confirmed federal
judges for the past several decades. Similarly, gay litigants may
have had more success in state courts recently not because of the
institutional factors I spell out here, but simply because the
judges in these fora reflect a broader ideological spectrum.
Given the complicated mix of institutional competence, political orientation, and other forum selection factors, 100 I would
not suggest that my argument be read as an inevitable presumption in favor of a state forum in civil rights cases generally, or in
gay cases specifically. A litigator would be remiss were she to
abandon a careful analysis of both the political character and the
institutional characteristics of the forum choices available. I can
imagine many situations in which I would prefer a particular
101
federal court to a particular state court. In making this analysis
in the future, though, I hope litigators will take into account the
institutional advantages of state courts discussed in this article.

Resnik, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1683·1700 (cited in note 77).
See generally Donald J. Farole, Jr., Interest Groups and Judicial Federalism: Organizational Litigation in State Judiciaries (Praeger, 1998) (on the role of interest groups in rights
litigation).
I 00. For example, a litigant might select a particular forum because of the speed with
which her claims will be addressed; if this is a primary concern, it could trump ideology or
institutional competence in certain circumstances.
101. See generally Chemerinsky, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at 605 (cited in note 5).
98.
99.
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If in so doing, they abandon an inevitable presumption in favor

of federal fora, I will have accomplished my goal.

102

V. CONCLUSION
The federal courts have hardly provided a haven from discrimination for lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals during the past
quarter century. Conversely, state courts have reached some
rather remarkable results in gay rights cases. The superficial explanation for this disparity lies in the character of the judges appointed by Ronald Reagan and George Bush. In this piece I
have attempted to explore the possibility of a more subtle explanation: namely, that state courts might enjoy some institutional
advantages in the resolution of civil rights claims. The exploration leads me to urge civil rights litigators generally to abandon a
rebuttable presumption in favor of federal courts and to consider
the possibility of a rebuttable presumption in favor of state
courts. Such a conclusion may seem heretical, as the superiority
of federal courts has been a sacred tenet of civil rights litigators
for decades, handed down from generation to generation. But,
to paraphrase Holmes, civil rights lawyers' notions about forum
selection cannot persist from blind imitation of the past. 103

102. Apologies to Kenji Yoshino, from whom I learned how to conclude an article.
Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and
the Case of" Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 Yale L.J. 485,571 (1998).
~~~·. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457,469 (1897) (stating
that [1]t IS revoltmg to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of
the past.").

